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Abstract: Extreme events are becoming more frequent and intense, inflating the economic
damages and social hardship set-off by natural catastrophes. Amidst budgetary cuts, there
is a growing concern on societies’ ability to design solvent disaster recovery strategies,
while addressing equity and affordability concerns. The participation of private sector
along with public one through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) has gained on importance
as a means to address these seemingly conflicting objectives through the provision of
(catastrophic) natural hazard insurance. This is the case of many OECD countries, notably
some EU Member States such as the United Kingdom and Spain. The EU legislator has
adapted to this new scenario and recently produced major reforms in the legislation and
regulation that govern the framework in which PPPs for (catastrophic) natural hazard
insurance develop. This paper has a dual objective: 1) review the complex legal
background that rules the provision of insurance against natural catastrophes in the EU
after these major reforms; 2) assess the implications of the reforms and offer concise Policy
Guiding Principles.
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1. Introduction
The steep upward-rising damage trend incurred by natural hazard risk and the alarming
prospects of man-made induced climate change inflate the economic losses and social
hardship set-off by extreme climate and weather events (IPCC, 2014; UNISDR, 2012). This
has alarmed the governments and the insurance enterprises alike. Many have suggested
that while the extreme events’ probability distribution is getting progressively more fattailed, the private insurance businesses alone will not be able to keep the pace (Botzen &
van den Bergh, 2008; Capitanio, Bielza, Cafiero, & Andolfini, 2011; DEFRA, 2013; Mills,
Roth Jr., & Lecomte, 2006; Munich Re, 2009; Surminski, 2009; Warner et al., 2013). The
unprecedented (EC, 2009a) economic crises the EU has faced since the summer 2007 has
sparked further concerns about the states’ ability to co-finance the disaster protection and
recovery, and the extent to which the public funds can compensate the private damage
even in countries where this is a regular practice (EC, 2013a). Similarly, to meet the
ambitious goals of the growth package for integrated European infrastructures (including
critical infrastructures to improve resiliency) alone by means of public funds restrained by
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is little probable (Mysiak, 2014). Hence the
participation of private sector along with public one in meeting the great societal
challenges has been increasingly advocated not only as an opportunity but as a sheer
necessity (EC, 2014a).
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), a term coined for the multiple ways of public and
private collaboration to provide a public service or project, have gained on importance
across OECD countries, notably in some EU Member States (MS) such as the United
Kingdom and Spain (Bielza et al., 2009; CEA, 2011a). The PPPs discussed in this paper
address provision of (catastrophic) natural hazard insurance for property owners and
enterprises located in areas exposed to low probability-high impact risks. While being in
origin a private service, equitable and accessible insurance against low probability/high
impact natural disasters may meet the scope of a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI),
that is a public service deemed by public authorities as being of particular importance to
citizens and that would not be supplied, or only under different conditions, if not for a
public intervention. Public-mandated and/or subsidised insurance systems existent in the
EU create PPPs that address this need.
Recently, the EU legislation and regulation that govern the framework in which PPPs for
(catastrophic) natural hazard insurance develop have experienced major reforms. Some of
these reforms are specifically designed to enhance insurance provision and governance
and tackle some of its flaws, as with the new Solvency II Directive. Some others define an
overarching set of norms aiming at the harmonization of European law, and are
transversal to insurance provision. These include the 2014 reform of public procurement that
governs PPPs, which revised the previous regulation of public works, supply and service
contracts, and introduced a new directive on concession contracts; changes of de minimis
aid and General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) in the context of national state aid
regulation; the development of the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and the reform of the

EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) for transnational support in disaster recovery; and the new
Environmental Liability Directive in the context of EU tort law. This paper has a dual
objective: 1) review the complex legislative framework that rules the provision of
insurance against natural catastrophes in the EU after these major reforms; 2) assess the
implications of the reforms and offer concise Policy Guiding Principles (PGP).
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present the current policy context for
natural hazard insurance in the EU. In section 3 we address in depth the EU policies
behind PPPs, focusing on the new directive on concession contracts (the most frequent
PPP form in the EU) and the changes of SGEI regulation the EC completed in early 2010s.
Section 4 is dedicated to the Union’s insurance market regulation and solvency
requirements (notably Solvency II Directive). In section 5 we discuss the EU state aid
regulation and recent changes of de minimis aid and GBER for making good the damage
caused by natural disasters. Section 6 is dedicated to the review of the Union transnational
solidarity provisions in the view of extraordinary natural disasters, including the
solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty of Functioning of European Union, TFEU),
along with the ISS and the EUSF. Section 7 attends to the various liability regimes across
the MS and the early attempts to harmonise the Civil law’s provision for tort liability.
Finally, in section 8 we offer PGP worth to follow when designing PPPs.

2. The policy context for natural hazard insurance in the EU
Insurance is but a part of the wider disaster risk management strategy. Disaster risk
management strategies are typically adapted to the specific challenges faced by a society at
risk, within the formal constraints imposed by the legal and institutional framework and
the informal ones stemming from local customs, traditions and norms (UNISDR 2012).
This complexity creates some degree of path dependency and slows down transitions
(Williamson, 2000). Accordingly, instruments for disaster risk management, including
insurance, display highly heterogeneous features and uneven coverage and penetration
rates across the Union (CEA 2011).
Disaster risk management entails a set of instruments aimed at minimizing economic
damage, in a first stage, and economic losses, in a second stage. Risk prevention and
protection instruments, including hard and soft engineering1, information and awareness
campaigns or economic incentives, among others, fall in the first stage. Despite these
barriers, economic damages are not always fully preventable, making necessary a second
stage consistent of damage compensation instruments Damage compensation instruments
ease recovery after a catastrophe, and are ultimately designed with the purpose of shortcircuiting the link between damages and losses2. Damage compensation policies are
Hard engineering projects involve the construction of artificial structures that prevent natural catastrophes (e.g., dams,
dykes, channel straightening and diversion spillways in the case of floods). Soft engineering projects are low
maintenance and low cost tools that integrate human activities with the natural processes and ecological systems in a
river basin (e.g., floodplain zoning/land use restrictions, afforestation, wetland restoration, river restoration).
1

2

For example, recent research has shown that sufficiently insured natural hazards are inconsequential in
terms of foregone output (Von Peter et al., 2012).

subject to regulation on liability –tort law-, and comprise the interplay between insurance
and state aid (see Figure 1).

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Risk prevention and protection is typically funded by the public sector, thus transferring part
of the hazard risk burden from risk-exposed asset holders to tax-payers. At least to some
extent this may distort risk perception and result in concentration of population and
wealth, and inflated property values, in highly exposed areas enjoying some comparative
advantages (e.g. aesthetic values, better soils, accessibility) (EC 2007a). This trend has been
particularly intense during the two decades of sustained economic growth before the
financial crisis started (Crichton, 2008). Instead of addressing this problem by deploying
complementary instruments to reduce risk exposure, natural catastrophe management has
become reactive and incremental. This reinforced observed trends and led to a rapid
increase in the marginal costs of protection, as more exposed areas are increasingly
expensive to protect (Botzen & van den Bergh 2008). The current financial crisis, which
amplified the opportunity costs of these investments, and the growing frequency and
intensity of the extreme events reported in the EU during the last years (UNISDR 2012),
added pressure on this unsustainable dynamics. In spite of the considerable uncertainty
surrounding the future projections of human induced climate change, it is expected that
damage caused by extreme climate and weather events will continue to raise, leading to
more frequent crises and demanding further investments (IPCC, 2014; Mirza, 2003).
Eventually, the marginal costs of protection infrastructures may (in some places already
did) reach a point where either the budgetary implications are prohibitive or the economic
costs outweigh the benefits.
At that point, traditional policy making based on risk prevention and protection becomes
insufficient per se to address the threat posed by extreme natural hazards. Damage
compensation policies such as tort law (liability) and ex-post state aid provide relief, but in
the aftermath of a low probability-high impact catastrophe they have proved to be
insufficient (tort law is applicable only under certain conditions) or increasingly
unaffordable (ex-post state aid) (CRED, 2015). Consequently, calls have been made for
transition towards more resilient and adaptive societies (OECD, 2014; UNISDR, 2012;
World Bank and CMI, 2011). In this context, insurance has received renewed attention, as
exemplified by the recent EU ‘Green Paper on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters’
(EC 2013a).
Insurance is an arrangement offering individual protection against the risk of losses
caused by various perils through pooling of risks (Baltensperger et al., 2007). Insurance is
complementary, rather than a substitute, to risk prevention and protection and other
damage compensation policies. Similarly to tort law and state aid, , insurance eases
recovery after a natural catastrophe and thus limits its economic impact. But unlike tort
law, it is widely applicable; and unlike ex-post state aid, it is (at least partially) privately

funded. Private actuarial insurance redistribute the cost of risk from tax-payers back to
asset holders. Moreover, if risk based pricing applies (e.g. flood insurance in the UK),
insurance introduces disincentives for risky behavior (Warner et al. 2009, Surminski 2009,
Surminski & Oramas-Dorta 2013). This could contribute to revert the current trends
towards higher risk exposure and facilitate the transition towards a resilient and adaptive
society. However, even assuming Pareto optimal insurance markets (heroic assumption 3)
that enhance disaster risk reduction, risk based pricing in private insurance markets does
not guarantee equity or affordability (EC 2013a). For example, risky assets in
disadvantaged areas may be relatively more expensive to insure, or even uninsurable,
attending to local income. This motivates public intervention in the market.
The inclusion of affordability and equity issues in the design of insurance against natural
catastrophes expands the role of the public sector from basic regulatory oversight and
residual risk management4 to a combination of ex-ante and ex-post subsidization, with an
active involvement in insurance design; this in turn demands new and more sophisticated
regulations, both at a national and EU level. Public intervention has also negative
byproducts, especially those concerning the weakening of the linkage between risk and
pricing and its negative impact over incentives for undertaking risk adaptation measures
(Surminski 2009). Managing this tradeoff poses relevant technical, operational and
coordination challenges (Pérez-Blanco & Gómez 2014). The overlapping roles and
conflicting outcomes of private and public agents interventions make necessary the
coordination between the public and private sectors through PPPs.

3. Public-Private Partnerships
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a form of cooperation between public authorities and
enterprises intended for provision5 of an infrastructure, a service or both (EC, 2004c). PPPs
are typically characterised as a long-lived relationship bringing forth mutually beneficial
resource and risk sharing arrangements (EC, 2004c). Though flexible in nature and
application, PPPs are substantiated either as a contract6 or an institutional entity (i.e.
Institutionalised PPP or IPPP). Both types are used for insurance provision in the EU.
Contractual PPPs embrace the ‘concessive model’. The public service concession means that a
contracting entity (public partner) entrusts a provision of public service to a contractor
(private partner) according to predetermined terms of reference, whereas the
remuneration of the service is covered by charges levied on the users of that service,
sometimes supplemented by public subsidies. The public work concession on the other hand
This would require perfectly competitive markets with no externalities, in full equilibrium, with negligible
transaction costs and perfect information.
4 Residual risk falls in the tail end risk; it is the uninsurable risk with a very small though unpredictable
likelihood and a potentially high though unpredictable damage. This uncertainty may be too high for private
insurance markets to develop without public support, and lies in the origin of PPPs for insurance provision
(Sugarman 2006).
5 I.e. funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance.
6Specifically, as ‘contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing’ (EC, 2004c).
3

implies that the contractor is chosen to carry out and administer an infrastructure (e.g.
water supply network) and is remunerated by users of that infrastructure which may be
supplemented by payments from contracting entity. This specific way of remuneration,
that is the right to exploit the work or service, is essentially what distinguishes classic
public service or works contracts (in which the pecuniary compensation to the contractor is
born directly by the contracting entity) from a public service or work concession. This right
however also connotes that the operational risk of not being able to recover the investment
costs is born essentially by the contractor and only to some extent by the contracting
entity. The Statement of Principles (SoP), a PPP between the UK government and the
insurance industry to offer affordable and equitable flood insurance, is close to this
concessive model (Surminski et al., 2014). According to this agreement, insurance is purely
underwritten by the private market, while government commits to flood risk management
activities. The SoP aims to make flood insurance available for households while managing
the financial implications for insurers7. The SoP can be traced back to the ‘Gentleman’s
Agreement’ that resulted from the 1952 flooding and the East Coast floods of 1953. By then
few properties held contents cover or buildings cover, leading to large uninsured losses.
Although initially considered, the government discarded compulsory insurance and opted
in favour of private providers until large losses again occurred in 1960. The government
aimed then at higher penetration rates, and these were attained, partly under the threat of
nationalisation if insurers failed to deliver more flood insurance to private, commercial
and industrial properties. The SoP was finally established in 2000 as a result of growing
flood losses. The SoP is now under transition to a new system, known as FloodRe8.
IPPPs are entities established for delivery of public works or services that are ‘held jointly’
by the public and private partners (EC, 2004c). The joint entity is responsible for delivering
the work or service for the benefit of the public. This is close to the French NatCat and the
Spanish Insurance Compensation Consortium (ICC) systems. In both cases insurance against
natural hazards is mandatory (linked with a base policy) and funded via a flat rate
surcharge on the insurance premium collected by private companies. Under NatCat, the
7

The SoP generally provides flood insurance to both households and small businesses up to floods with a
1:75 return period. Those properties facing higher risk should be granted cover after being informed by the
Environmental Agency about plans to improve flood defences in the area in the next five years –although
this has been noted as not having actually been available. Government commits to investment in flood
defences and improved flood risk data provision as well as a strengthened planning system. The 2007 floods
and concerns regarding rising intensity and frequency of floods led the insurance industry to maintain that
the SoP was a temporary solution.
8
FloodRe maintains a free market approach to low-risks, but the high risk households will obtain flood
insurance cover via a not-for-profit pool (FloodRe). The subsidy for the latter is claimed from a levy taken
from all policyholders. This levy will be £10.50 per policy for a total aggregate sum of £180m. To maintain
affordability the pricing limits of insurance policies are determined by council tax bands, allowing low
income homes a better opportunity to meet the costs. Allegedly, FloodRe will reduce incentives to reduce
exposure to flood events by property owners and will ultimately result in higher flood risk and damages
(Surminski et al., 2014). FloodRe agreements are subject to agreement with the European Commission for
State Aid approval, and this may bring into question the design of the scheme and its eventual
implementation (Surminski et al., 2014).

French State co-manages the insurance fund (setting additional premiums, establishing
deductibles and declaring the state of natural catastrophe), offers reinsurance (through the
state owned Casse Centrale de Réassurance) and channels part of the resources into a statemanaged fund for the development of prevention and protection instruments. On the
other hand, under the Spanish system the ICC provides direct insurance against natural
hazards on a subsidiary basis if the cover is not explicitly assumed by a private company
or the company cannot meet its indemnification obligations. As a result, premium
surcharges vary widely, from 0.008%-0.021% in Spain to 6-12% of the insurance premium
in France (Maccaferri et al., 2012).

PPPs are not defined by Union’s legislation and regulation directly. However, within the
ambit of the Treaty of Functioning of European Union (TFEU), PPPs qualify either as
public contracts or public concessions (EC, 2005a). While public contracts and partly
public work concessions were regulated by Community secondary legislation for long
time, until recently the public service concessions were only subject to TFEU rules and
principles of transparency, equality of treatment, proportionality and mutual recognition. The
Interpretative Communication on concessions under Community law (EC, 2000) provided
some clarity of the concept and guidance for public authorities for selecting a
concessionaire, but did not disperse the legal uncertainty. In 2004, the EC carried out a
public consultation as for whether a concerted action was needed to harmonise the
governing rules of PPPs (EC, 2004c). Based on the feedbacks and comments received, the
EC decided, among others, to i) not pursue a new piece of legislation addressing all
contractual PPPs; ii) explore a scope for a policy filling the regulatory gap with respect to
the public service concession (later materialised through the Directive 2014/23/EU, see
below); and iii) develop an interpretative communication on IPPPs (initially scheduled for
2006, but still pending) (EC, 2005a).
Directive 2014/23/EU (OJ, 2014a) and the revised rules for public procurement (Directives
2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU) (OJ, 2014b, 2014c) provide greater legal certainty for the
participation of private enterprises in PPPs through service concessions. The set of rules rely
on the ‘competitive dialog’ scheme introduced in 2004 (EC, 2004a). The competitive dialog
enables the public authorities to ‘negotiate’ the alternative means of fulfilling its needs and
identify so the solutions best suited. The major development introduced in the reform is
the concept of ‘innovation partnership’, which grants a similar flexibility for the
development of innovative products, services or works, not already available on the
market (EC, 2014c).

4. Insurance market regulation
The Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC (OJ, 2009) codifies and harmonizes regulation on
insurance across the Union. It represents the latest among a series of efforts to facilitate the
development of a single market in insurance services, while ensuring an adequate level of

consumer protection. Following an EU Parliament vote on the Omnibus II Directive9 on 11
March 2014, Solvency II is scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2016 and replace 13
previous EU directives.
Early EU solvency regulations go back to the 1970s. Substantial modifications were
adopted through the new generation of insurance directives in the 1990s, which eventually
led to the Solvency I Directive (OJ, 2002), and have finally crystalized in Solvency II. As its
predecessors, Solvency II regulates margin requirements to limit the risk of insolvency.
The newly added regulations include authorization, corporate governance, supervisory
reporting, public disclosure, risk assessment and management, as well as other aspects of
solvency and reserving. The Solvency II project is divided in three areas (OJ, 2009) or
‘pillars’ (EIOPA, 2014): quantitative basis (Pillar 1), qualitative requirements (Pillar 2), and
enhanced reporting and disclosure (Pillar 3).
Pillar 1 focuses on quantitative solvency in two ways: i) it addresses how insurers value
their liabilities and assets; and ii) specifies the amount of resources insurers need to hold to
make sure they are solvent and able to pay eventual claims by policyholders. For the
former, Solvency II introduces EU-wide harmonized valuation standards. In the latter
case, two thresholds are established: Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and Minimum
Capital Requirement (MCR). The SCR is the capital that guarantees that the insurance
company will be capable of meeting its obligations during 12 months with a probability
higher or equal to 99,5 per cent. It is calculated using a standard formula or (only under
regulatory approval) an internal model. The MCR represents the capital threshold below
which the regulator intervenes the insurance company. It is calculated as a linear function
of specified variables and cannot fall below 25 per cent, or exceed 45 per cent of an
insurer's SCR.
Pillar 2 addresses how the structure and management of insurance businesses are
governed, enabling insurers to identify, measure, monitor, manage and report risks to
which they are exposed. In particular, it comprises i) the Own Risk & Solvency
Assessment (ORSA), a decision-making tool that continuously assesses the solvency needs
related to the specific risk profile of the insurance company; ii) a risk management system
that quantifies and models risks, not limited to a contribution to the ORSA and also
including involvement in asset-liability management, risk mitigation arrangements, etc.;
and iii) a supervisory review and intervention including an independent internal audit
function.
Pillar 3 specifies what information insurers report on their business and how it is reported.
Some reports are public and anyone can see them, while others are privately reported to
the financial regulator. Insurers are required to publish details of the risks facing them,
capital adequacy and risk management. Enhanced reporting and disclosure provides

9

The Solvency II directive needs to be adapted to the implementing measures introduced in the Lisbon Treaty (OJ,
2007) and the financial supervision measures introduced in the Regulation 1094/2010 (which established the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, EIOPA) (OJ, 2010). The harmonization process is
implemented through the Omnibus II directive (EC, 2011b), adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2013 and
by the EU Parliament in March 2014.

transparency and open information that help to assist market forces in imposing discipline
on the industry.
The implementation of the Solvency II directive is overseen by the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which succeeded the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). The activity of
these authorities comprises advice on implementing measures (comprising 5 Quantitative
Impact Studies, large scale field-testing exercises to assess the practicability, the
implications and possible impact of the different alternatives considered) and advice on
equivalence assessments (analysing the compatibility between the solvency regime of a third
country and that of Solvency II, and implemented so far for Switzerland, Japan and
Bermuda) (EIOPA, 2014).
On 31 January 2014, EIOPA defined a timeline with the objective of delivering the
regulatory and supervisory framework for the successful technical implementation of the
Solvency II regime from 1 January 2016 onwards (although this date has been previously
pushed back many times). This will be done through the delivery of Implementing Technical
Standards (or ITS, legally binding standards to ensure the uniform application of the
Solvency II Directive) and Guidelines (to all national supervisors). These two products will
be developed in two sets each. For the ITS, Set 1 will comprise “Approval processes” and
Set 2 the three pillars plus “supervisory transparency”. For the Guidelines, Set 1 will
comprise “Guidelines relevant for approval processes, including Pillar 1 and internal
models” and Set 2 “Guidelines relevant for Pillar 2 and Pillar 3”(EIOPA, 2014).
Solvency II sets a broad, unique and transparent regulatory framework for insurance
provision and solvency assessment. Predefined solvency thresholds (Pillar 1),
homogeneous assessment methods (Pillar 2) and consistent reporting (Pillar 3) offer a
sound basis to accurately identify and address the need for public support in the provision
of insurance against low probability-high impact risks, addressing different degrees of
equity and affordability.

5. State aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters
Regular financial support by the public sector is a key component of PPPs for equitable
and affordable insurance provision, and typically supplied through ex-ante (e.g. premium
subsidization) and/or ex-post (e.g. public reinsurance) subsidization in compliance with
national and Union’s regulation (Maccaferri et al., 2012). Besides that, public funding for
direct damage compensation is sporadically supplied after intense natural catastrophes
that existent disaster risk management strategies cannot cope with. This may be the result
of insufficient prevention and protection systems, flaws in insurance design (e.g. deficient
solvency regulation, limited risks coverage, low market penetration rates) and/or the
unique nature of the natural disaster. In this scenario, MSs may opt to compensate the
residual costs above the (insufficient) absorption capacity of the risk management strategy.
The EU displays a comprehensive set of regulations on how state aid can be implemented.

State aid on selective basis that distorts (or threatens to distort) free-market competition is,
according to the Article 107 of the TFEU, incompatible with the EU internal (single)
market (EC, 2014d). The coma 2(b) of the same Article declared an aid to make good the
damage caused by natural disasters10 admissible, provided that any intention to grant a
similar aid is (i) timely notified to the European Commission (EC) (Article 108 TFEU), and
(ii) the EC raises no objection (Article 4 of the Council regulation 659/1999; (EC, 1999).
Without a prior notification, an aid not otherwise exempted11 is not permitted and an
already provided unlawful aid may be revoked. The regulation applies to state aid
granted to economic undertakings only and any compensation of losses to individuals
(citizens) not associated with pursuing of any economic activity does not constitute state
aid in the sense of the Article 107 of the TFEU.
The Council regulation 994/98 (EC, 1998), amended in 2013 (EC, 2013b), empowered the
Commission to declare some categories or levels of aid as compatible with internal market
and hence exempt them from the notification requirement. These provisions are known as
group exemptions and de minimis aid. As a part of the State Aid Modernisation initiative
(EC, 2012a), the Commission has revised and simplified both de minimis aid regulation and
the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). The categories for which block
exemptions can be applied were substantially extended in 2013 to include, among others,
the aid in favour of making good the damage caused by natural disasters and aid making
good the damage caused by certain adverse weather conditions in fisheries (EC, 2013b).
The reform of de minimis aid (EC, 2013a) maintained the ceiling of €200.000 for a single
undertaking over a period of three fiscal years12 irrespective of the form of aid and
expressed as net present value if granted through periodic instalments. If granted in other
than direct grant, such as soft loan or guarantee, the gross grant equivalent of the aid
needs to be estimated. A subsidised loan up to €1.000.000 over a period of 5 years is
possible under the revised de minimis aid rules if the loan is secured by collateral covering
to the level of at least 50 percent of the loan.
Finally, the Commission Regulation 651/2014 (EC, 2014a) exempted aid to make good
damage caused by natural disasters from the obligation to notify the state aid, pursuant to
the following conditions: First, the regulation declared ‘earthquakes, landslides, floods (in
particular floods brought about by waters overflowing river banks or lake shores),
avalanches, tornadoes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and wildfires of natural origin’ (EC,
2014a, recital 69 and Article 50(1)) as events constituting a natural disaster, while
excluding damage arising from adverse weather conditions (frost, hail, ice, rain or
drought); second, the damaging event has to be recognised by competent authorities as a
natural disaster; a clear causal link needs to be established between the disaster and
damage suffered; and the total payments for making good the damage, including the
payments under insurance policy, may not exceed 100 per cent of eligible damage costs;
10

Until recently, there was no unambiguous definition of what constitutes ‘natural disaster’ for the scope of
the state aid regulation, although floods and some other natural hazard risks have been recognised as such
previously (EC, 2013f).
11 See further down for the exemptions from the notification requirement.
12 Except the road freight transport sector for which the ceiling is €100.000.

third, the aid scheme has to be introduced within three years, and any aid granted within
four years after the disaster; fourth, the eligible damage costs include material damage
incurred as a result of disaster and loss of income resulting from suspension of activity for
a period of six months after the disaster event occurred (the damage assessment based on
repair cost or economic value of the affected asset before the disaster should be certified by
accredited experts or insurance undertaking).
Over the period between December 2006 and May 2014, the EC delivered 85 decisions on
the granting of state aid (EC, 2014e). The years 2010 and 2013 stand out for the highest
number of notified aid schemes (22 in each year), followed by the years 2011 and 2012.
Germany, Italy and Spain feature among the countries who initiated most schemes. Direct
grants are the most frequent form of aid, followed by soft loans and interest subsidies,
while debt write-off, tax deferment, reduction of social security contributions and
guarantee represent relatively less preferred ways of aid provision. As an established
practice, the Commission has considered aid to make good damage caused by natural
disasters compatible with the internal market if i) a clearly established causal link exists
between the damage and the natural disaster; and ii) the aid does not exceed damage
experienced (EC, 2014e).
The only case on record in which the Commission decided to initiate a formal
investigation refers to not notified aid schemes granted by the Italian government in the
aftermath of the 1990 Sicily earthquake, the 1994 floods in the Northern Italy, and the 2009
Abruzzi earthquake (SA.35083/SA.35083) (EC, 2014e). Note that for the latter disaster the
EU Solidarity Fund (see section 6) was mobilised for more than €490 million. The form of
aid included suspension, deferral, or payment in instalments of taxes and compulsory
social security and occupational insurance contributions by undertakings located in the
disaster affected municipalities. Following the Eastern Sicily earthquake on 13-16/12/1990,
the payment of taxes and contributions for years 1999-1992 was deferred until 2000s and
subsequently reduced to 10 per cent of the amount due. Similar aid was granted in the
aftermath of the November 1994 flood in the Northern Italy for the years 1995-1997, the
April 2009 Abruzzo earthquake for the years 2009-2010. In 2007 and 2010 the Italian
Supreme Court of Cassation ruled that the reduction of taxes and contributions granted
ought to be applied to all undertakings who could have claimed the same right, to avoid
‘unjustified disparity in treatment’. The EC enjoined Italy to suspend any aid under these
schemes and opened a formal investigation. If eventually the EC rules the aid as unlawful,
it may decide to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

6. Solidarity in the wake of extraordinary natural disasters
Some natural catastrophes may overcome not only disaster risk management strategies,
but also the budgetary constraints of the MS to deal with the damages, making necessary
resorting to transnational Union’s resources. Solidarity between the Union’s MSs,
extended somewhat to the candidate and occasionally neighbouring countries, pervade
the EU primary and secondary legislation. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) uplifted

«solidarity» to essential values on which the Union is based and which include respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and respect for human rights
(Article 2). The Chapter IV (Articles 27-38) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union is entirely dedicated to solidarity (social and economic) rights and
justiciable civil and political rights (O’leary, 2005). The former include, among others,
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) such as social and territorial cohesion
(Article 36), and environmental protection and improved quality of the environment
(Article 38).
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) substantiates the solidarity
principles through the Articles 174-175, 196, and 222. The Article 174 recognizes (actions
meant to strengthen) economic, social and territorial cohesion as vital for harmonious
development. Hence the Union shall act towards reducing disparities between the levels
of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.
The latter include rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which
suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps. The Article 175
compels conduct and coordination of economic policies towards attainment of the
objectives set in Article 174, through the policies and actions taken through Structural
Funds, the European Investment Bank, and Financial Instruments. Turning to disaster risk
reduction, the Article 196 stipulates a cooperation between MSs to improve risk
prevention, protection and response to the natural and man-made disasters.
The article 222 of TFEU (the Solidarity Clause, SC) invokes solidarity, in the most explicit
way (Myrdal, 2010) in cases of a terrorist attack, or a natural or man-made disaster13. When
requested by a Member State (MS), victim of a disaster or a terrorist attack, the Union is
bound to ‘mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources’
(emphasis added). The declaration (37) on Article 222 of the TFEU however leaves the
choice of the ‘most appropriate means’ to comply with solidarity obligation to the MS. The
SC complements, or offers alternatives to, the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) of TEU)
which compels aid and assistance in the case of armed aggression.
Coma 3 of the article 222 of the TFEU stipulates that the practical implementation of the
SC shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (hereafter High Representative). Coma 4 compels a regular assessment, by
European Council, of the threats the Union is facing to enable an effective action.
The SC is invoked by a request of the affected MS in the wake of an extraordinary threat or
damage beyond own response capacity of the state, after all other means, national and at
Union level, have been exploited. Whereas it is a sole decision of the MS whether or not to
invoke SC, the European Parliament (EP) emphasised that it is a primary responsibility of
each MS to invest in own security and disaster response capabilities, rather than rely
excessively on the solidarity of others (EP, 2012). However, when the MS made the call, ‘it
The scope of the solidarity clause includes the land, sea and air of the EU territory, the ships in
international waters and airplanes in international airspace, as well as critical infrastructure such as off-shore
oil and gas installations under the jurisdiction of a Member State (Myrdal, 2010).
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should not be a matter for debate for the others to offer assistance’ (EP, 2012). Once the SC has
been invoked, the Commission and the High Representative jointly identify and mobilise
the best suited Union’s instruments and, if necessary, suggest how these should be further
reinforced. The proposed implementation of SC (EC, 2012b) defines crisis14 and disaster15
rather broadly and in a way which is not entirely consistent with natural disasters as
stipulated by the State Aid regulation (see previous section).

The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), created in 2002 (EU Council, 2002) and
amended in June 2014 (EC, 2014g), translates solidarity in form of financial aids to the EU
Member and Candidate countries experiencing ‘serious repercussions on living conditions, the
natural environment or the economy’ following a natural disaster (EC, 2014g). Attempts to
extend the scope of the Fund to the man-made disasters (EC, 2005b) were unsuccessful so
far. According to the newly revised rules, the EUSF can be mobilised in cases in which the
direct damage exceeds 3 billion Eur (in 2011 prices) or 0,6 per cent of the country's gross
national income (GNI), whichever is the lower, or if the damage at regional (NUTS2) level
exceeds 1,5 per cent16 of that region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A neighbouring MS
or accession country that is affected by the same disaster can also receive aid, even if the
amount of damage does not reach the threshold. The EUSF has an annual budget of 500
million Eur, down from a billion under the previous regulation (EU Council, 2002). The
aid is limited to non-insurable damages and essential emergency and recovery operations17.
The recent reform of the EUSF respond to some weaknesses identified previously in (EC,
2009b, 2011a, 2013e) with respect to the rapidity of the aid and the transparency of the
criteria allowing mobilising of the Fund.
The EUSF is not the only instrument available. The EU Internal Security Fund (EC, 2014e),
established in April 2014, and the resources endowed to the new EU Union Civil
Protection Mechanism (EC, 2013c) provide additional resources that can be mobilised for
an extended cooperation across the MS in the field of prevention, protection and response
to the natural hazard risk. Furthermore, the article 122 of the TFEU empowers the Council
to grant additional financial assistance, in spirit of solidarity, to the MS ‘threatened with
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control’.
Coordination of EU solidarity instruments listed above along with MSs own security
policies and strategies is implemented through the Union’s Internal Security Strategy (ISS)
adopted in 2010 (EC, 2010b). ISS portrays a European Security Model as a pool of existing
tools, along with commitments for further cooperation and solidarity among MSs, and under
Crisis: A serious, unexpected and often dangerous situation, requiring timely action; a situation that may
affect or threaten lives, environment, critical infrastructure or core societal functions, may be caused by a
natural or manmade disaster or terrorist attacks.
15 Disaster: any situation, which has or may have an adverse impact on people, the environment or property.
16 This threshold is lowered in cases of outermost regions to 1 per cent of regional GDP.
17 Including infrastructure restoration in the fields of energy, water and waste water, telecommunications,
transport, health and education; temporary accommodation and rescue services; preventive infrastructure
and measures of protection of cultural heritage; and cleaning up disaster-stricken areas, including natural
zones.
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a close involvement of the EU institutions, agencies and bodies (EC, 2010b, 2010d). The
risks posed by natural and man-made hazards are targeted by the ISS along with
organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, and management of EU external borders.
Solidarity is exhibited between Member States ‘in the face of challenges which cannot be met by
Member States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole’ (EC,
2010d). The ISS sets to, among others, ‘increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters’. This
comprises crises and disasters including those associated with climate change, requiring
‘both solidarity in response, and responsibility in prevention and preparedness’ (EC, 2010b). The
ISS placed an emphasis on multi-hazard risk assessment covering all natural and manmade disasters. In the pursue of this goal, the EC elaborated the Guidance on risk
assessment and mapping (EC, 2010a) and a Synthesis cross-sectoral assessment of major
natural and man-made risks (EC, 2014b), the latter based on the National Risk Assessment
(NRA) reports produced by 17 MSs and Norway. The newly revised Union’s Civil
Protection Mechanism (CPM) regulation (EC, 2013c) introduced an obligation for all MSs
to report, starting from 2015 and every three years thereafter, on risk assessments at
national or appropriate subnational level and risk management capabilities (Article 6 of
the Decision 1313/2013/EU).
Likewise, a proposal in the sense of the Article 222(3) of the TFEU was released in
December 2012 (EC, 2012b) as an umbrella framework of the existing instruments and
policies, notably the European Union Internal Security Strategy, the European Union Civil
Protection Mechanism (EC, 2013c), the European Union Solidarity Fund (EC, 2014f; EU
Council, 2002), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

7. Civil and environmental liability
The reparation of disaster losses caused or exacerbated intentionally or through negligence
or omission that damage rights or protected interests of others can be granted through civil
liability. The established liability systems across the EU Member States differ substantially
in taxonomy and structure (von Bar & Drobnig, 2004). The German civil code for example
associates general liability for fault with cases where the wrongdoer infringed a legal right
of the victim (Wagner, 2009). In contrary, the scope of English tort law is based on the duty
of care. English and Irish Common Law distinguish some 70 torts among which the most
important ones for our scope are trespass, negligence, breach of statutory duty, and
nuisance (von Bar & Drobnig, 2004). An example of nuisance is a use of land which cause
damage or interference with another's use and enjoyment of their land. Under the English
and Irish Common Law’s common enemy doctrine a landowner is empowered to defend his
land from diffused surface waters, for example by improving the drainage system, while
increasing the volume of discharged water on lower property. In contrary, the German
civil law doctrine subjects landowners to a flowage easements for natural drainage patterns.
Hence the landowners cannot alter the drainage pattern of their own land in a way that
increases the discharged water on lower properties of others. The reasonable use doctrine is
a compromise of the both, in a sense that while some alteration of natural drainage
patterns is necessary, it is only lawful if conducted in a reasonable manner and the utility

of drainage outweighs the gravity of resulting harm to others. Similarly, the U.S.
Association of State Floodplain Managers has advocated a No Adverse Impact18 (NAI)
management principle (J. Kusler, 2011), adopted also in some EU MS (Mysiak et al., 2014).
According to NAI, the actions of one property owner are not allowed to adversely affect
the rights of other property owners.
The EC backed the development of ‘Common Frame of Reference’ (CFR), primarily in the
contract law, as a collection of common principles, terminology and model rules to be
referred to by the Union legislator (EC, 2003). The Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR; Von Bar, Clive, & Schulte Nölke, 2009) was conceived as a legal experts’ response
to the EC quest; an attempt to harmonise European private law. The book VI of the almost
5.000 long compilation addresses non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to
another. The term ‘non-contractual liability’ is neutral in language used in common law
civil law systems, making reference to the incidence of damage being the only connection
between the damaged party and the party held accountable. The DCFR Article VI.–1:101
states ‘a person who suffers legally relevant damage has a right to reparation from a person
who caused the damage intentionally or negligently or is otherwise accountable for the
causation of the damage’ (emphasis added) (Von Bar et al., 2009, p. 2978). The legally
relevant damage (Article VI.–2:101) is a (economic or non-economic) loss or injury resulting
from a violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law or from a violation of an interest
worthy of legal protection.
The European Group on Tort Law produced in 2005 an alternative compilation of
guidelines aiming at the harmonization of European tort law, the Principles of European
Tort Law (PETL) (European Group on Tort Law, 2005). It defines the damage as a
‘material or immaterial harm to a legally protected interest’ (Art. 2:101) while the
accountability for the damage is given either by a fault, or by abnormally dangerous
activity (Art. 1:101).
The Union’s primary and secondary legislation has a little sway over the liability regimes
across the MS. Generally, the damages for which third parties are held liable are excluded
from the eligible damage in the state aid regulation and the solidarity aid. The so-called
Rome Regulations (EC, 2007b, 2008) specify rules on cross-border contractual, noncontractual, and pre-contractual obligations in situations where there is a conflict of law.
In 2010 the EC launched a consultation on how to make contract law in the EU more
coherent (EC, 2010c). Included among the presented policy options, but not supported by
the stakeholders, was the option (7) aiming at establishing a European Civil Code covering
tort law and other obligations along with the contract law.
An exception from the above is the liability for damage caused to environment addressed
by the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD; 2004/35/CE). The ELD (EC, 2004b) was
adopted in 2004 but applies only to activities that caused environmental damage after the
full transposition of the Directive into national legislative frameworks (i.e. April 30th,
No Adverse Impact floodplain management is an approach which ensures that the action of one property
owner does not adversely impact the properties and rights of other property owners (J. A. Kusler & Thomas,
2007)
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2007). The ELD does not supplant civil liability insofar only the damage caused to
environment (i.e. protected species and habitats, water and land) is comprised.
Consequently, personal injuries, damage to property or economic losses incurred to third
parties are not tackled, as they are subject of civil liability claims. Likewise, the
environmental damage caused by ‘a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character’ (Article 4) is exempted from the scope of the Directive. The ELD
holds liable both physical and natural, private and public persons. In line with the Article
191(2) TFEU committing the environmental damage rectification ‘at source’ and by
polluter, the ELD obliges those who exercise or control occupational activities causing
environmental damage19 to i) adopt preventive and remedial measures; and ii) inform
competent authorities. The Directive distinguishes two liability regimes: First, strict liability
applied to activities listed in the Annex III holds the operator liable irrespective of whether
the damage caused is a result of fault or negligence. Second, the fault-based liability applies
to any other activities not listed in Annex III for damage to protected species and natural
habitats only in case of proved fault and/or negligence. MSs are left wide discretion
whether or not to impose financial security mechanisms, including for the case of
insolvency, so that the operator is capable to fulfil the imposed liability. The ELD is due to
be reviewed in 201420 and the European Commission may propose the amendments
deemed necessary. The EC commissioned several reports analysing the ELD transposition
by MSs, definition of biodiversity damage, and possible revision of the Annex III activities
(BIO Intelligence Service, 2012, 2013; Ltd & IUCN, 2014; Salès, Mugdal, & Fogleman, 2014;
Stevens & Bolton LLP, 2013). The possible changes include imposing a strict liability on
activities currently under fault-based liability regime, extending the scope of the
environmental damage to the air; a stricter regulation of the financial security and
guarantees; and establishment of an industrial fund.

8. Conclusions
We have reviewed and analysed Union’s legislation and regulation setting a playground
for private insurance against natural hazard risk, and crafting options for PPPs in the
wake of natural catastrophes. Our analysis concentrated on i) public procurement and
concessions; ii) internal market regulation of insurance and solvency; iii) state aid for
making good the damage caused by natural disasters; iv) European Union Solidarity Fund
and transnational disaster prevention and response policies, in the framework of the SC;
and v) civil and environmental liability. On this basis we draw a preliminary list of Policy
Guiding Principles (PGP) that allow for better designing a PPP for (catastrophic) natural
hazards insurance provision.
The recent directive 2014/23/EU on public concession contracts along with the revised
rules of public procurement have contributed to a greater legal certainty and flexibility in
the design of PPPs, especially the public service concession which accounts for an estimated
In the sense of the Article 2
Due to delays in reporting and evaluation, the report expected by April 2014 will be submitted in 2015 (see
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/index.htm, accessed in January 2015)
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60 per cent of the partnership programs in Europe. The reconfirmed competitive dialog and
newly introduced innovation partnership in public procurement regulation provide for
opportunity to develop innovative and well-tailored partnership schemes where existing
marketable products are either not available or not suitable for the given purpose; this is
the case of equitable and affordable insurance provision for property owners and
enterprises located in areas exposed to low probability-high impact risks, with least
competition distorting effects. Including the catastrophic natural hazards insurance among
the Services of General Economic (if not social) Interest (SGEI) allow even greater
flexibility of procurement and higher thresholds of de minimis state aid, compared to
otherwise. Though the Member States (MS) are left a wide discretion in this area, the
practical feasibility of declaring an affordable and equitable state-participated catastrophe
insurance partnership as a SGEI is yet to be closely explored.
The insurance partnerships in which the state plays a role as a partner will have to comply
with solvency requirements even if operating under state guarantee. It is of public interest
to render the guarantee transparent in terms of state aid regulation, that is assessed in
terms of gross grant equivalent. A sound risk analysis and assessment is an essential
prerequisite and a preferred theme to be addressed in PPPs. The reformed GBER has no
bearing on the public-private ventures but makes it easier to develop alternative state
administered or supervised schemes of economic recovery in the aftermath of the disaster.
This may encourage the MS to keep open the gateway for direct grants or other parallel
forms of economic aid to citizens and enterprises, within the margins of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). While account is taken for disaster induced hardship in the SGP
corrective arms (the excessive deficit procedure), recent calls to exclude the disaster
recovery and protection expenditure from the SGP margins may undermine the fiscal
rigour and consolidation. On contrary, the reduction of the annual endowment of the EU
Solidarity Fund from one to a half of billion, while extending the scope of its mobilisation
(regional disasters are eligible on their own right and not as a derogation from the general
rule), may possibly lead to more frequent calls for a larger public compensation and aid in
the aftermath of a disaster.

The definition of what constitutes a disaster beyond the coping capacity of the MS is
contingent to the scope of the regulation. The ISS and DRR policies substantiating the
TFEU solidarity clause embrace a broad-spectrum of natural and man-made hazards,
leaving the decision of summoning for assistance to the affected MS. Similarly, the other
MSs may choose the most appropriate means of assistance upon their own judgement and
assessment. In contrary, the state aid regulation is more conservative and narrows down
substantially the eligible natural hazards exempted from the notification obligation.
Borrowing from the policies reviewed in the paper we draw PGP that are valuable for the
design of PPPs for (catastrophic) natural hazard insurance provision in the EU context.
First, the partnerships should be well-designed and targeted at market failures, that is
uninsurable losses and the design of affordable, socially-fair risk transfer mechanisms.
Second, the partnerships should promote a sound use of public resources while limiting to

the extent possible the distortion of competition. This also means that the partnerships
should not substitute or sustain actions that would materialise anyway (additionality
principle). The agreements should actively promote or at least not harm the incentive for
risk reduction, for example by making the individual insurance costs reflecting those risks
that result from each individual’s choices (e.g. rewarding with lower premiums
behaviours that reduce exposure and vulnerability and penalizing actions that go in the
opposite direction). Third, the partnership should be built on principles of transparency,
equal treatment and effective analysis and monitoring. Sound risk analysis and
assessment along the agreed principles is the most encouraged scope of a collaboration.
The MS are obliged to produce both sector specific assessment (for example under the
Floods Directive) and cross-sector assessment under the reformed Civil Protection
Mechanism. Regrettably, the costs of data collection is not contemplated among the
eligible expenses under the EUSF. Fourth, the sustainability of the partnership should be
based on clear rules of viability and legitimacy.
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